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International Comparison Discussion Paper
May 2006
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Part 2 - Summary Comparison
with Overseas Jurisdictions
Introduction
This part of the discussion paper compares
the prohibitions and the redress and enforcement
provisions in the Fair Trading Act (FTA)
and the Consumer Guarantees Act (CGA)
with those that are found in consumer protection
legislation in Australia, the United Kingdom,
Canada and the United States of America. All
four jurisdictions were chosen because of common
consumer protection principles and policy to
those in New Zealand. Australia and Canada were
also chosen because the drafting of New Zealand's
consumer protection legislation was substantially
informed by their legislation. The misleading
and deceptive conduct and product safety provisions
found in the
FTA
largely mirror those found in Australia's Trade
Practices Act. The
CGA
is based on the Saskatchewan Consumer Protection
Act (prior to 1997).
This comparison has been done in order to
identify whether
- other similar jurisdictions' approaches
to consumer protection policy have diverged
since referenced in the drafting of the
FTA
and the
CGA, in 1986 and 1993 respectively;
and
- different prohibitions and provisions
to protect consumers and honest businesses
have been adopted since the enactment of
the
FTA and the
CGA.
Where key differences between the New Zealand
legislation and the overseas legislation have
been identified, these are examined in more
depth and the advantages and disadvantages for
New Zealand of adopting such provisions are
considered.
Unlike New Zealand, the other jurisdictions
have consumer protection legislation at the
national and the state, local or provincial
level. For the purposes of this comparison exercise,
the FTA
and the
CGA
have been compared with consumer protection
legislation found at both levels of government.
Given the size of the New Zealand market and
the fact that consumer protection is a national
issue with no recognised regional differences
in this country, the option of legislating for
consumer protection at both the local as well
as the national level was not considered as
part of the analysis.
Similarities across
the Jurisdictions
Overall, the
FTA
and the
CGA
contain prohibitions and redress and enforcement
provisions that are very similar to those that
are available in consumer protection legislation
in Australia, the United Kingdom, Canada and
the United States of America.
In all these jurisdictions, the legislation
contains prohibitions that intervene in the
market at the pre market, market and after market
stages. Misleading and deceptive conduct and
pyramid schemes are prohibited and all the legislation
contains product safety provisions.
The legislation across the jurisdictions
also usually contains redress and/or enforcement
provisions. When contraventions of the guarantee
(conditions and warranties) provisions occur,
consumers are usually (except for in the United
States) required to take action for themselves
in order to get redress.
Civil and criminal penalties are available
in most legislation and consumers can take disputes
to a small claims or dispute tribunal as well
as to courts.
Enforcement agencies are responsible for
taking action under some of the legislation.
As well as enforcement, these agencies often
also have or adopt an educative or information
provision role. In all cases, the enforcement
agencies that operate at the national (or federal)
level do not act on behalf of individual consumers
in order to settle disputes.
The fines available in the legislation are
similar across the jurisdictions with the highest
fines found in the Australian legislation. As
well as court proceedings, settlements and undertakings
are also used by enforcement agencies in an
attempt to secure compliance with the legislation.
In Summary
- New Zealand's consumer protection
legislation remains consistent with
consumer protection legislation in similar
jurisdictions overseas.
- The overseas legislation is seeking
to achieve similar outcomes to the
FTA and the
CGA
- Traders comply with the legislation;
- Consumers have effective access
to redress; and
- Consumers seek redress when
a transaction is unsatisfactory.
- Whilst there are no significantly
different approaches in the overseas
legislation, analysis has indicated
that there may be some additional, particularly
mid level enforcement tools, that may
be worth considering for adoption.
Differences across
the Jurisdictions
The following table identifies the main differences
that were found between consumer protection
legislation in New Zealand, Australia, Canada,
the United Kingdom and the United States of
America.
Table 1: Differences across the
Jurisdictions
| Issue |
Jurisdiction |
|
NZ |
Australia |
Canada |
UK |
US |
| Definition of
consumer |
Consumer
definition in the
CGA focuses on consumers
and type and use of goods. |
Consumer
definition includes consumers and
small business. |
Provincial
definitions define consumers as
non-traders. |
General
definitions in various statutes.
Consumers are non-traders. |
FTC[12]
law has several definitions of consumer,
depending on context. If comparison
is made with legislation that has
provisions that are the equivalent
of
CGA, the consumer definition
is very similar to
NZ
definition. |
| Prohibitions
- unfair terms in consumer contracts |
No specific
prohibition for unfair terms in
consumer contracts. |
Unfair
terms in consumer contracts are
prohibited in state of Victoria.
|
Many provincial
governments prohibit unfair practices
which include unfair terms in consumer
contracts. |
Unfair
terms in consumer contracts are
prohibited. |
The
Uniform Commercial Code
(adopted by most states) prohibits
terms in contracts that are unconscionable. |
| Prohibitions
- unconscionable conduct |
Unconscionable
conduct is covered by common law
and Section 19 (1) (e) and (f) of
the Disputes Tribunal Act 1988.
Courts must decide if conduct is
unconscionable. |
Unconscionable
conduct is covered by statute as
well as common law. Courts must
decide if conduct is unconscionable. |
Unconscionable
conduct prohibitions are in statute. |
Unconscionable
conduct is covered by common law
only. Courts must decide if conduct
is unconscionable. |
Uniform Commercial Code prohibits
unbalanced contracts, but unconscionable
conduct is left to the courts to
decide. |
| Industry codes
of conduct |
Provisions
covering industry codes of practice
are not in legislation. |
Provisions
covering industry codes in legislation
and overseen by
ACCC.[13] |
Provisions
covering industry codes of practice
are not in legislation. |
Legislation
allows the
OFT[14]
to approve and promote industry
codes. |
Provisions
covering industry codes of practice
are not in legislation. |
| Enforcement -
court enforceable undertakings |
No court-enforceable
undertakings available. The Commerce
Commission uses the administrative
system of settlements. |
At federal
and state level, contravention of
an undertaking can result in court
action by the enforcement agency. |
At federal
and provincial level, contravention
of an undertaking can result in
court action by the enforcement
agency. |
Contravention
of an undertaking can result in
court action by the enforcement
agency. |
Breach
of a "cease and desist" order (more
of an undertaking) can result in
court action taken by the enforcement
agency and a fine. |
| Enforcement -
compulsory Interview |
No ability
to require a trader to attend a
compulsory interview. |
ACCC has the power to issue
demands for information, including
appearing before the
ACCC in person. Also a requirement
in some state legislation. |
Traders
voluntarily attend an interview
at both federal and provincial level. |
Formal
interviews can be carried out, in
accordance with The Police and Criminal
Evidence Act 1984. |
"Civil
Investigative Demands" can be used
to gain verbal testimony. |
| Enforcement -
banning traders |
No ability
to ban a recidivist offender. |
Some states
can ban traders from supplying goods
and services. |
Courts
can ban individuals from trading
for a period of time. |
No banning
provisions. |
Courts
have the ability to bar an individual
from making claims without substantiation.
Provisions appear to ban activities
rather than individuals. |
| Enforcement -
super-complaints |
Consumer
bodies do not have a special ability
to refer consumer complaints to
Commerce Commission. |
Consumer
bodies do not have a special ability
to refer consumer complaints to
ACCC. |
Consumer
bodies do not have a special ability
to refer consumer complaints to
the enforcement agencies. |
Designated
consumer bodies can lodge super-complaints
to the
OFT. |
Consumer
bodies do not have a special ability
to refer consumer complaints to
the enforcement agencies. |
| Enforcement -
product safety |
No requirement
for Product Safety Warning Notices. |
Product
Safety Warning Notices published
in the Gazette announce
when a good is under investigation
for being unsafe. |
No warning
notices. Notification of warning
through press releases. |
No warning
notices. Notification of warning
through press releases. |
No warning
notices. Onus on companies to issue
forms of notification. |
| Redress - defective
product |
A person
who has suffered injury from a defective
product is covered by
ACC.[15] |
A person
who has suffered loss or damage
from a defective product can take
private court action. |
A person
who has suffered loss or damage
from a defective product can take
private court action. |
A person
who has suffered loss or damage
from a defective product can take
private court action. |
A person
who has suffered loss or damage
from a defective product can take
private court action. |
| Enforcement -
substantiation Notices |
No substantiation
notices requiring traders to prove
claims. |
Substantiation
notices can be issued to traders
to require them to prove claims. |
Competition
Act requires advertisers to substantiate
all material claims. |
Advertisers
are required to provide substantiation
for claims to
UK
ASA[16] if
a complaint is received. |
FTC has a substantiation
policy for advertising. |
| Enforcement -
cease and desist |
No cease
and desist orders. |
No cease
and desist orders at federal level
but available in some states. |
Cease
and desist orders available.
|
Enforcement
orders under the Enterprise Act. |
Cease
and desist orders under the
FTCA. Cease and desist orders
are assessed by a district court.
|
| Enforcement -penalties
- formal cautions |
No formal
cautions. |
No formal
cautions. |
No formal
cautions. |
Formal
cautions provide an alternative
to prosecution and are recorded
on the Central Register of Convictions.
|
No formal
cautions. |
The Pyramid of
Responsive Regulation
The comparison shows that, compared to overseas
regulation, New Zealand consumer protection
law is limited in the range of sanctions (particularly
mid-level) that it can use in an attempt to
secure compliance with the
FTA.
Regulatory compliance is best secured when
enforcement agencies use persuasion and negotiation
techniques rather than enforcement measures.
For these techniques to be effective, however,
enforcement agencies must have at their disposal
a range of escalating sanctions which can be
used if an individual or business chooses not
to cooperate or when the contravention represents
a serious breach of the legislation. Non-compliance
is less attractive for individuals and businesses
if the enforcement agency is able to escalate
the sanction should persuasion be ineffective
or inappropriate given the nature of the alleged
breach.
The process whereby enforcement agencies
can escalate the level of sanctions that they
use is often depicted by way of the pyramid
of responsive regulation. At the base of the
pyramid are the most frequently used and least
severe sanctions while the most severe sanctions
are found at the peak. According to this model,
enforcement agencies that have a number of sanctions
at their disposal, as depicted by a tall pyramid,
are the most effective. This is because the
sanctions at the peak can exert pressure which
can motivate individuals and businesses to voluntarily
comply - the threat of a more severe form of
punishment encourages individuals and businesses
to comply.
Figure 1: Pyramid of Responsive Regulation

(Adapted from the work of Ayres
and Braithwaite (1992) and Gilligan, Bird and
Ramsay, 1999)
Compared with the range of sanctions available
in similar legislation overseas, New Zealand's
FTA
lacks a number of sanctions particularly those
that are represented in the mid levels of the
pyramid of responsive regulation. The
FTA
provides for civil and criminal remedies. The
Commerce Commission has also developed an administrative
system whereby it issues letters of compliance,
warnings and enters into settlements with parties.
Unlike enforcement agencies in other jurisdictions,
the Commerce Commission cannot issue product
safety warning notices or cease and desist orders,
require businesses to substantiate claims and
accept court enforceable undertakings or require
individuals to attend a compulsory interview.
If the Commission believes that an alleged breach
of the Act has occurred that can not be adequately
dealt with administratively, the only alternative
is to take court action. Court action, however,
is resource intensive and the presence of mid-level
enforcement sanctions mean that the same outcome
could be achieved more efficiently. In the last
three years, according to the Commerce Commission,
the costs of litigation have trebled and the
number of Fair Trading Act cases in the court
system has doubled.
As well as lacking the mid level enforcement
sanctions, the
FTA
does not contain penalties that can incapacitate
recidivist offenders.[17]
In other jurisdictions, enforcement agencies
have the ability to apply for incapacitative
orders which can prevent an individual from
trading. The severest sanctions available under
the Fair Trading Act are civil and criminal
penalties. These penalties take the form of
monetary fines. The maximum fines available
are $60,000 for an individual and $200,000[18]f or
a body corporate. Monetary penalties, however,
do not appear to act as a deterrent when used
against recidivist offenders. In 1994, for example,
the Commerce Commission obtained interim injunctions
against Michael Knight relating to alleged breaches
of the FTA
by two companies that he had promoted. Knight
then transferred his business activities to
Australia where he was subsequently banned for
life from trading in New South Wales and restrained
from engaging in trade or commerce relating
to the tourism industry in Queensland. Following
his return to New Zealand, Knight was convicted
in April 2002 of thirty three breaches of the
FTA.
Knight was also sentenced in July 2004 on 12
further charges of breaching the Fair Trading
Act.
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